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T 
he expenditures of American local governments ac- 
count for over half of all domestic governmental 
expenditures and support a wide array of services affect- 
ing peoples' everyday lives; budgeting processes of local 
governments have become prime targets of reformers. By 
shifting greater budgetary control to elected officials and 
the general public, reformers hope to enhance the public 
accountability of governmental taxing and spending 
policies. 
A series of technical reforms reflect this concern for 
improving public control of governmental budgeting de- 
cisions. Underlying and extending beyond these efforts is 
the development of more sophisticated computer-based 
information systems. One of the most technologically 
advanced and potentially far-reaching of these is a family 
of computer-based models which we have called "Fiscal 
Impact Budgeting Systems" (FIBS). While FIBS are 
largely promoted as a tool for increasing the rational 
control of budgetary decision making, their use is unlikely 
to have this effect. Ironically, FIBS are as likely to rein- 
force the existing biases of budgetary decision processes 
as they are to be an instrument for reform. 
FIBS are large-scale, comprehensive computer models 
which forecast local government service needs, expendi- 
ture levels, and revenues for the coming fiscal year(s). 
Such forecasts are based on historical expenditure and 
revenue data; community land use, housing and demo- 
graphic data; governmental characteristics; intergovern- 
mental funding relationships; taxation rates; and projected 
changes in these characteristics. The models define the 
relationships among these elements by sets of mathemat- 
ical equations and instructions. The projections from the 
models can be of direct relevance to governmental 
budgeting decisions if they are made at a level of detail 
which reflects the budget categories of operating depart- 
ments. 
Fiscal impact budgeting systems generally are com- 
prised of leading-edge urban development, fiscal impact, 
and budgeting models which are linked so that the outputs 
of some component models are inputs to other component 
models. The result is a new kind of "system level" model 
which can serve a function much broader than, and differ- 
ent from, the fiscal impact and urban development models 
used by planners in the past. These more traditional 
analyses range from back-of-the-envelope m thods for 
estimating the costs and revenues of a projected popula- 
tion change to finely tuned and sophisticated models 
which project the costs and revenues of new land uses. 
Such methods are components ofmany FIBS but fall short 
of a complete system. Likewise, urban development 
models, which have been analytical tools of planners, are 
often components of FIBS but fall short of a complete 
system. Urban development models range from both re- 
gional and subregional population and employment allo- 
cation models to functional models of transportation, air 
quality, water, and sewer services. These models some- 
times give attention to cost and revenue impacts, but 
seldom have been linked to budgetary processes. It is 
more useful to view fiscal impact budgeting systems as an 
outgrowth of large-scale corporate planning models in the 
private sector than as natural extensions of traditional 
fiscal impact analyses. 
Diffusion of Fiscal Impact Budgeting Systems 
Fiscal impact budgeting systems are important because 
they might shortly be widely diffused among local gov- 
ernments. Urban fiscal problems have created a receptiv- 
ity to management reforms like FIBS which promise to 
improve the productivity of local governments. These 
fiscal problems refer to the general inability of local gov- 
ernments to respond to their financial predicament. Local 
government officials are faced with public pressure to 
reduce taxes and with rising costs and heightened e- 
mands for government services. This fiscal crisis is mag- 
nified in many metropolitan areas by continuing dis- 
parities in the distribution of resources and needs. The 
suburbs have the greatest ability to pay, while central 
cities have the greatest need for governmental services. 
Typically, local governments are too weak politically to 
cut taxes and spending sharply, to increase taxes suffi- 
ciently to meet escalating costs and demands, or to redis- 
tribute resources. 
The growth of state and federal aid to local govern- 
ments and the shifting of more functions to counties, 
metropolitan-wide jurisdictions, and special districts are 
feasible approaches to increasing local revenues and les- 
sening fiscal disparities. However, intergovernmental aid
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has reached politically unpopular levels, and metropolitan 
consolidation efforts have met continuing and increasing 
resistance. Consequently, local governments are pushed 
towards politically more popular options for alleviating 
their financial problems and managing conflicting de- 
mands. One option has been to increase the municipal 
debt, passing the political buck to future generations. This 
option is closed to local governments with strict legal 
limits on indebtedness. Furthermore, overindebtedness 
has contributed to the near financial collapse of more 
cities than New York and Cleveland. A more prevalent 
option has been a search for ways to enhance productivity 
by improving the quality of local government taxing and 
spending decisions. 
The widespread diffusion of management science mod- 
els has created a receptive intellectual climate which is 
likely to facilitate the adoption of FIBS. Although few 
cities and counties had adopted computer models by the 
mid-1970s, the use of various models by local govern- 
ments has at least tripled from 1975 to the present. The 
most widely adopted models have been and will be in the 
budget and management area. Twenty-five percent of 
U.S. cities over 50,000 and 11 percent of counties over 
100,000 had an expenditure forecasting model in 1975. 
Twenty percent of the cities and 14 percent of the counties 
over 100,000 had a revenue forecasting model. By now, 
each of these kinds of models is likely to have been 
adopted by a full third of U.S. cities and counties. More- 
over, a small but growing proportion of local governments 
have adopted FIBS. With some exceptions, these local 
governments tend to be increasing in population, located 
in the sunbelt, relatively professional, and relatively 
affluent. FIBS have been adopted initially as a planning 
tool for forecasting the consequences of urban develop- 
ment and implementing selective growth management 
policies. Yet in some local governments, the models are 
already being used as a management as well as a planning 
tool. The models are potentially as useful to developed, 
and even decaying, cities as to the developing cities. They 
can be used to forecast he fiscal impacts of changing 
federal and state funding levels, population decline, rede- 
velopment projects, or tax reductions. The market for 
FIBS is vast. 
Given this market, there are an adequate number of 
models and suppliers to support and promote the wide- 
spread iffusion of FIBS. There are about en versions of 
FIBS within the U.S. today which can be relatively easily 
transferred. The most generalized software packages for 
fiscal impact budgeting are the Municipal Impact Evalua- 
tion System (MUNIES), the Fiscal Impact Analysis Sys- 
tem (FIAS), the Local Government Fiscal Impact Model 
(FIM), and the Fiscal Impact System for Communities 
(FISCOM). These packages have strong institutional 
bases for marketing, are similar in their overall purpose, 
and are competing models in the local government 
marketplace. The relatively low cost of acquiring FIBS by 
local governments facilitates their widespread adoption. 
Costs range from a few thousand ollars for the purchase 
of a user's manual to about fifty thousand ollars for 
installation of the largest model. 
FIBS in Theory and Practice 
FIBS are a classic management science response to a 
classic policy problem--developing more rational control 
by elected officials and the general public over decisions 
that affect the fiscal position of government. FIBS are 
expected to do this through improvements in information 
processing, content, and flows. 
FIBS are expected to greatly facilitate the work of 
budget and management analysts in making service, reve- 
nue, and expenditure projections for the coming fiscal 
year(s). By utilizing the recordkeeping, calculating/ 
printing, record-restructuring a dsophisticated analytical 
capabilities of the computer, FIBS are designed to reduce 
the workload of menial and exacting tasks involved with 
budget decisions. The time of budget and management 
analysts can be more appropriately focused on reviewing 
such decisions as the reasonableness of budgeting as- 
sumptions rather than the accuracy of routine calcula- 
tions. In this way, budget and management analysts will 
be able to provide more timely and adequate support to top 
management and elected officials. 
The main impact of FIBS is expected improvement in 
the content of information available to central manage- 
ment, elected officials, and the general public. FIBS are 
expected to insure more accurate information, permit 
analysts to explore a wider range of alternative policy 
decisions, and free budgetary decisions from traditional 
incrementalist budgeting assumptions which artificially 
constrain policy alternatives. By providing more and bet- 
ter information to elected officials and the public, FIBS 
might then enhance the rationality of public control over 
budgetary decisions. 
FIBS are expected to alter the character of information 
flows. FIBS might accomplish this, first, by presenting 
forecasts of the service, revenue, and expenditure impli- 
cations of alternative policy decisions in a simple format 
(e.g., comparable tolocal government budget documents) 
that is directly relevant to lay officials. Second, FIBS are 
expected to change information flows by presenting 
elected officials with information which is less filtered 
and distorted than that available through the more tradi- 
tional decentralized and fragmented budgetary process. 
Third, FIBS are expected to have a major educational role 
by informing elected officials and the public not only of 
the fiscal impacts of decisions but also of the major as- 
sumptions underlying these fiscal projections. 
Whether these expectations are realized in practice is 
problematic. Some research indicates that many local 
governments have failed to achieve the expected benefits 
of computer-based information systems due to the manner 
in which their systems have been implemented atthe local 
level. Other research suggests that decision makers sel- 
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dom make particularly effective use of information, even 
when available. 
The potential of FIBS to increase the control of elected 
officials and the general public over budgetary decisions 
might be realized by the following improvements: (1) 
facilitating the work of management and budget analysts, 
(2) improving the accuracy of information, (3) enabling 
officials to explore a wider array of policy alternatives, (4) 
freeing officials from traditional incremental budgeting 
practices, (5) simplifying decisions by reducing com- 
plexity through the modeling process, (6) centralizing 
information flows, and (7) educating elected officials and 
the public. Do the experiences of local governments sup- 
port these expectations? And even if these expectations 
are fulfilled, will local government decision makers 
utilize this information to enhance rational public control 
over budgetary decisions? 
There is little doubt that computers increase the speed, 
ease, and accuracy of information-processing tasks. In- 
terviews with local government management and budget 
analysts reinforce this benefit in the case of FIBS. In fact, 
officials in one of the earliest cities to adopt a FIBS claim 
these technical benefits to be the only benefits of FIBS. 
According to one of their top budget officials, their use of 
a FIBS model has simply increased the speed, ease, and 
timeliness of calculations and bookkeeping procedures 
that were done manually prior to their adoption of a FIBS. 
In response to inquiries from cities considering adoption 
of their model, they have recommended against adoption 
unless the jurisdiction is of sufficient size to justify the 
costs of the model simply as a high speed calculator. 
While officials of other cities often attribute more benefits 
to FIBS, most officials agree that FIBS do facilitate the 
work of budget and management analysts in preparing 
service, revenue, and expenditure forecasts as compared 
to manual procedures done with the aid of a hand cal- 
culator. 
FIBS might be justified if they simply provided more 
accurate revenue and expenditure forecasts than currently 
available. Such accuracy would not only facilitate more 
rational decisions but also improve financial management 
by permitting less conservative estimates of revenues and 
more liberal expenditures, given that uncertainty leads 
most budget makers to be on the safe side (underestimat- 
ing revenues and therefore budgeting lower expenditures 
than might be made with more accurate stimates). How- 
ever, the accuracy of FIBS forecasts are largely unknown 
and the reliance on these estimates, even if accurate, 
might increase the vulnerability of local governments o
unpredictable r venue and expenditure fluctuations. 
The questionable accuracy of FIBS derives from three 
considerations. First, the validation of these models is 
based normally on studies conducted in sites where these 
models were developed. The transfer of these models to 
other governments raises questions of their generality. 
Second, the accuracy of the forecasts i  dependent on the 
quality of assumptions and input data developed at the 
local site. For example, historical budgetary data is often 
used for projections although budgeted allocations are 
likely to differ significantly from actual revenues and 
expenditures given the generally wide latitude of urban 
administrators in executing local budgets. Third, many of 
these models are anchored in data several years old. Most 
models are heavily dependent on U.S. census data. One of 
the most sophisticated FIBS takes census data from 1970 
to project 1971 estimates. These 1971 estimates are then 
used to project 1972 estimates and so on until projections 
are made for the upcoming fiscal year. By making esti- 
mates on the basis of estimates in combination with local 
guesstimates, the models task the confidence of even the 
most loyal modeler. 
Increased vulnerability of organizations to unpredict- 
able revenue and expenditure fluctuations might well re- 
sult from the perceived accuracy of forecasting tools such 
as FIBS. That is, as budget makers become more confi- 
dent of revenue and expenditure forecasts, they are likely 
to match more closely budgeted expenditures with antici- 
pated revenues. They will be less likely to estimate reve- 
nues conservatively and therefore be less likely to budget 
expenditures conservatively. Yet natural disasters, exces- 
sive snowfalls, radical fluctuations in the municipal bond 
markets, public employee strikes, and so forth cannot be 
anticipated. Such unpredictable fluctuations might well 
create short-term fiscal crises for governments which have 
moved away from more traditional and conservative fi- 
nancial management s rategies. 
Governmental budgets are traditionally based on a very 
limited search of alternative taxing, spending, and (re)de- 
velopment policies. This is a function of both the incre- 
mental nature of budgetary decision making and the com- 
plexity of evaluating the budgetary implications of alter- 
native decisions. Complexity leads the rational decision 
maker to a limited search for a satisfactory alternative. 
Fiscal impact budgeting systems are thought o provide 
the technical capability for participants in the budgeting 
process to evaluate the budgetary impacts of a broader 
array of alternative taxing, spending, and" (re)develop- 
ment decisions. A major benefit of FIBS derives from 
their use as high-speed calculators and bookkeepers. The 
consequences of slight variations in model assumptions 
can be rapidly computed with most computerized 
FIBS--an impossible bookkeeping task without FIBS. 
In practice, however, local government officials place 
severe restrictions on the number of alternative scenarios 
which are evaluated with a FIBS. One southwestern city 
utilized a FIBS model to compare only two policy alterna- 
tives, a managed growth plan versus the continuation of 
current growth trends. In an effort to simplify decision 
making and to manage the complexity of using the model 
itself, officials are reluctant to use FIBS in the very way 
they might be most beneficial. In addition, FIBS might 
actually narrow the array of alternatives considered by 
portraying the budget as externally determined by chang- 
ing environmental conditions. Rather than FIBS answer- 
ing many "what if" questions of decision makers, FIBS 
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forecasts ometimes evolve into self-fulfilling prophe- 
cies, for they prescribe the "rational" budgetary response 
to a changing urban environment. 
The traditional means for simplifying the budgetary 
decision-making process is reliance on incremental deci- 
sion making. Decision makers focus their attention on 
deviations from last year's budget requests and assume 
that past decisions remain acceptable. Incrementalism is 
commonly criticized as theoretically irrational even if 
practically rational given the nearly impossible task of 
reconsidering all controllable budget items each fiscal 
year. FIBS may offer an alternative means for simplifying 
budgetary decisions by prescribing service and expendi- 
ture needs on the basis of environmental data and, there- 
fore, allow more radical departures from incremental de- 
cision rules than possible in the past. A major problem 
with this argument is the dependence of most FIBS on 
historical service, revenue, and expenditure data to derive 
estimates of model parameters ( uch as the number of 
patrol officers required per capita) and make forecasts. 
That is, FIBS are based on incrementalist assumptions 
regarding the acceptability ofpast decisions. Use of FIBS 
is likely to reinforce decisions which are consistent with 
decisions based on traditional incremental decision mak- 
ing rules. 
A major impetus for the development of management 
science models generally and FIBS specifically is the 
complexity of problems confronting decision makers. By 
consciously ignoring some phenomena and emphasizing 
others, models aim to reduce the complexity of the real 
world to a manageable l vel. FIBS introduce awide array 
of simplifying assumptions and provide budgetary fore- 
casts in formats no more complicated than the budgets of 
local governments. Yet FIBS introduce anew complexity 
to the budgeting process. One virtue of computer models 
is that a large number of parameters, variables, and inter- 
relationships can be incorporated. As a consequence, 
most FIBS are incomprehensible, or at least extremely 
complex, to most users. Very few people understand the 
underlying structure and logic of FIBS. The developers of 
FIBS do not have a clear understanding of their com- 
petitors' models. Their size, complexity, and proprietary 
status combine to make FIBS too complex for local gov- 
ernment decision makers to understand. As a conse- 
quence, FIBS place a new demand on decision makers 
who seldom trust and use techniques which are not under- 
stood. 
Budgeting models could alter information flows such 
that top elected officials have better information to control 
budgetary decisions. Traditionally, major budgetary deci- 
sions are fragmented and decentralized among the various 
departments and agencies of local governments. Budget- 
ing models could provide elected officials with indepen- 
dent and objective stimates of departmental and agency 
needs with which they can counter budget requests. 
FIBS supposedly provide objective information. Gov- 
ernmental budgets are traditionally more dependent on 
internal decision criteria than are the budgets of organiza- 
tions in a market environment which have more clear and 
concrete environmental information. Fiscal impact 
budgeting systems are designed to assess the taxing and 
spending implications of environmental information 
which is widely available to local governments. Some 
hope (while others fear) that local government budgeting 
decisions may become less dependent on internal decision 
criteria such as the forcefulness of a department head or 
the weight of an interested group. By linking revenue- 
expenditure forecasts to objective and quantitative n- 
vironmental data, these forecasts might be less subject o 
manipulation by departments and agencies seeking to 
maintain and enhance their resources during the annual 
budget cycle. 
The "objectivity" of FIBS model outputs is at best 
unclear and at worst a fiction. FIBS are likely to introduce 
systematic biases into revenue-expenditure forecasts 
which are invisible to local government decision makers 
due to the complexity of the models. For example, FIBS 
models often have a pro-growth bias because users nor- 
mally "overweigh" the short-term revenue gains and 
"underweigh" the long-term carrying costs of population 
growth. 
Implementation f FIBS requires that local government 
officials make many assumptions and estimates of such 
factors as the number of patrol officers required per 
capita, the rate of inflation, and the revenue capacity of 
single family housing. Most FIBS models require literally 
hundreds of such simplifying assumptions on the part of 
the adopter. These assumptions generally are not made by 
the top elected officials. Rather, as in the past, such 
technical decisions are passed own to the department and 
agency levels, although central management s aff often 
coordinate the completion of this process of specifying the 
model. In short, FIBS produce outputs which appear far 
more objective than they are in fact. 
Similarly, the independence of information reaching 
elected officials is more apparent han real, given the 
manner in which FIBS are implemented. The high degree 
of departmental involvement in developing the initial ser- 
vice, revenue, and expenditure assumptions provides the 
departments with ample opportunities to inject their tradi- 
tional biases into the final model outputs. The mystique 
and authority surrounding computer models might even 
enhance the credibility attached to these outputs. FIBS are 
more likely to decrease rather than increase the influence 
of elected officials over budgetary decisions by giving 
more credibility to departmental opinions. 
FIBS might serve an educational function by making 
the assumptions underlying budget forecasts more 
explicit, increasing the sensitivity of officials to the fiscal 
impacts of their choices, learning-by-modeling, and pro- 
viding a new tool for public oversight of governmental 
decisions. The experience of cities now using FIBS sug- 
gests these impacts are quite limited and entail some 
dysfunctional side effects. 
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FIBS are expected to make revenue-expenditure as- 
sumptions explicit and therefore open to debate. Unfortu- 
nately, there are two major problems in accomplishing 
this outcome. The first is that the proprietary nature and 
complexity of some FIBS prevent an explicit considera- 
tion of a number of model assumptions. Even if local 
governments had the inhouse capability to evaluate mod- 
els by means of structural and sensitivity analyses, the size 
and complexity of the models would make such exercises 
extremely difficult and costly. Secondly, assumptions and 
biases which might enter during the implementation phase 
within a particular local government might be 
documented and in that sense made explicit. Given that 
literally hundreds of these assumptions are made through 
a normally decentralized process, few if any individuals 
could carefully evaluate the reasonableness of a large 
proportion of these assumptions. Even fewer people 
would comprehend the cumulative and interactive ffects 
of the complete set of assumptions. 
Budgeting models are expected to make the fiscal con- 
sequences of local government decisions more visible and 
hence more accountable to public scrutiny. This is the 
most commonly expected educational impact of using a 
FIBS. However, this impact might well be the most inher- 
ent bias attached to FIBS use. For example, the very use of 
a fiscal impact budgeting system will tend to focus atten- 
tion on the fiscal impacts of decisions and deflect attention 
from social and environmental impacts. Increased public 
sensitivity to fiscal impacts might well decrease public 
sensitivity to social and environmental impacts. Few fis- 
cal impact budgeting models incorporate social or en- 
vironmental costs of benefits into their framework. 
The process of modeling might be an educational proc- 
ess for elected officials. Research on the use of computer 
models, especially urban development models, suggests 
that the modeling process has an educational benefit. 
However, Martin Greenberger, Matthew Crenson, and 
Brian Crissey suggest that one of the primary functions of 
modeling is the education of the modeler, not the model 
user. Modeling develops a small group of experts in- 
formed by the modeling effort. Unfortunately, this small 
group of experts is not composed of elected officials--the 
users of FIBS. The education of budget and management 
analysts and department staff seldom enhances public 
control, rather it increases the influence of the technical 
experts. 
Modeling is sometimes expected to serve an even 
broader community educational function. A model might 
serve to crystallize debate, clarify conflicts, and sharpen 
the precision of public discussions. The use of multiple 
models, adversary modeling, and counter modeling could 
become an extremely valuable community teaching aid. 
We are aware of only one city in which such a process was 
approximated. In this case, counter modeling developed 
only after years of protracted community conflict over 
growth policy. Both pro- and anti-growth advocates were 
eventually armed with their own models. Given that FIBS 
are likely to be used on a frequent basis for normally 
routine budgetary decisions, their use is unlikely to pro- 
vide the time or provoke the intensity of opinions which 
spurred such counter-model ing efforts. In some 
documented cases of counter modeling, the efforts were 
often instrumental in blocking or delaying decisions, and 
tended to deflect debate from substantive issues to the 
entrails of the opposing models. It is doubtful that FIBS 
will serve as a tool for increasing public oversight. 
Most of the expected improvements attributed to FIBS 
have not been realized by local governments which have 
implemented them. Even if these improvements were 
realized, would these models be utilized in ways which 
would enhance the rational control of budgetary deci- 
sions? Here again, our case studies and the computing 
literature suggest that FIBS are more likely to be used to 
reinforce xisting biases than as a rational tool for decision 
making. 
Computer-based information is often used selectively. 
The experience of one northern city in which a major FIBS 
was developed is illustrative of a general tendency. Dur- 
ing the development and implementation phase of the 
model, its use was supported by elected officials with a 
pro-growth orientation. After the general election, not 
only did the pro-growth elected officials disappear, but 
also the model which was perceived as supportive of a 
pro-growth policy. 
Models are commonly employed to serve political 
functions contrary to the rationality motives used to justify 
their adoption. These political functions of models in- 
clude their use to block or delay rather than to solve a 
particular decision problem. Models also serve as a sym- 
bolic response to problems. Modeling problem solutions 
might be the contemporary equivalent of"referring it to a 
committee." Models are often used intentionally to shift 
the relative priority of different interests in the decision- 
making process by altering the budgetary process and 
outcomes. 
Embedded within every fiscal impact budgeting system 
are explicit and implicit assumptions and theories which 
can systematically influence the model outputs in ways 
which advantage certain groups or interests within the 
local community. Models are seldom neutral, unbiased 
reflections of existing scientific theories used to raise the 
factual basis of debates among opposing interests. Rather, 
models are most often developed in ways which incorpo- 
rate biases which purposefully favor different interests. 
For example, fiscal impact budgeting systems can be 
developed such that they have a pro-growth bias by over- 
weighing the short-term revenue gains and underweighing 
the long-term carrying costs of population growth. In 
addition, models are embedded with various normative 
assumptions and biases that exist less by design than by 
the numerous technical choices made by the model de- 
signers. 
Use of a fiscal impact budgeting system for selective 
growth management is likely to bias decisions in favor of 
fiscal conservatism instead of other ends like maximizing 
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urban amenities, redistributing wealth, or increasing the 
quality of social services. Not only does the use of a fiscal 
impact budgeting system suggest hat fiscal impacts are 
considered important criteria to the decision makers, but 
also that decision makers will be more likely to take fiscal 
impacts into account because the model makes such in- 
formation available and lessens the importance of internal 
decision criteria. 
The political use of fiscal impact budgeting systems can 
influence the outcomes of governmental decisions. Mod- 
els can be used as a tool to gain credibility, publicity, and 
legitimacy in order to persuade others to support a given 
policy. For example, FIBS have been used to exacerbate 
urban fiscal problems rather than aid in their solution. 
This results from their use by the growing and affluent 
jurisdictions to show that low income housing is a fiscal 
drain on the community. Thus, HBS are used by those 
jurisdictions least affected by the urban fiscal crisis to 
perpetuate exclusionary policies which have fueled the 
crisis. 
Reforming FIBS Use 
Governmental structures and processes are not politi- 
cally neutral--they tend to favor some interests over 
others. Recent research suggests that computers tend to 
extend and reinforce the prevailing biases of govern- 
mental structures and processes. Those who control ocal 
government decisions have adapted computer technology 
to serve existing structures of influence and control by 
determining the kinds of applications adopted and selec- 
tively utilizing available computer-based information. 
Ironically, fiscal impact budgeting systems have been 
promoted as a tool for reforming the budgetary processes 
of local governments. Rather than being a tool for reform, 
FIBS, like many other computer applications, tend to 
automate the existing biases of the budgetary process. 
HBS are unlikely to increase rational public control of 
budgetary decisions; they are likely to perpetuate many 
traditional biases generated by incrementalist assump- 
tions and decentralized control over budgetary decisions. 
FIBS might well exaggerate hese biases due to the com- 
plexity and mystique of computer-based models. 
The appropriate course for local government officials is 
not clear. On the one hand, the urban fiscal crisis has 
increased emands for better financial planning and man- 
agement. There are few tools other than FIBS which 
provide local governments he potential for generating 
service, revenue, and expenditure forecasts. FIBS do 
facilitate the work of budget and management analysts in 
preparing these forecasts. On the other hand, HBS are 
likely to accentuate xisting biases and introduce new 
biases into the budgetary process. Biased generation of 
service, revenue, and expenditure forecasts may be worse 
than none, especially if the adopters of FIBS fail to recog- 
nize the limits of computer-based models for promoting 
more rational public control over budgetary decisions. 
For FIBS to reform the budgetary decision-making 
process, the processes by which models are adopted, 
implemented, and used by local governments must be 
reformed. At minimum, top elected officials must be 
intimately involved with the selection and implementation 
of these models. Their involvement in model selection 
must be sufficient o provide the elected officials with 
understanding of the basic differences among competing 
models. This includes understanding the assumptions and 
kinds of outputs produced by the models as well as the 
theory embedded in their functional operation. Moreover, 
elected officials must be sufficiently involved in model 
implementation to insure that the models embody their 
values and decision premises rather than, as is so fre- 
quently the case, only those of the planners and analysts 
who operate the models. Second, in addition, elected 
officials and the public must have access to experts who 
can interpret the outputs of models in lay terms. The direct 
outputs of models frequently are too complex and techni- 
cal for elected officials and the public to comprehend 
without data reduction, simplification, interpretation, and 
context setting. Third, adversary modeling should be a 
standard rather than exceptional procedure in model use. 
The great advantage of computer models is that they can 
be used to try out many alternatives. Adversary modeling 
is more likely to insure that a range of alternatives are 
considered and that the alternatives are vigorously ana- 
lyzed and evaluated. Moreover, it is likely to insure that 
alternatives which various groups in the community con- 
sider important are included in the decision process. Fi- 
nally, it is critical that all of these reforms be implemented 
in concert, since no single reform is sufficient o counter- 
balance the automation of bias common to HBS and other 
computer models. [] 
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